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1.	Introduction	
The	 global	 financial	 crisis	 has	 ushered	 in	 a	 major	 housing	 crisis	 in	 many	 European	 countries:	 severe	
shortage	 of	 affordable	 housing,	 high	 rates	 of	 housing	 deprivation	 especially	 in	 Europe’s	 East,	 over-
indebted	 homeowners,	 massive	 evictions	 in	 some	 Southern	 European	 countries,	 and	 increase	 in	
homelessness	are	the	symptoms	of	the	re-emergence	of	the	“housing	question”	(Engels	1872).	To	a	large	
extent,	the	current	housing	crisis	reveals	the	failure	of	past	policies,	which	saw	the	solution	to	affordable	
housing	in	privatization	of	housing,	securitization	of	mortgages	and	“financial	inclusion”	of	poorer	people	
via	the	relaxation	of	borrowing	standards,	and	subsidization	of	“subprime”	lending.	Given	the	extent	of	
the	 housing	 crisis,	 there	 is	 scantly	 a	 clearer	 time	 to	 expect	 social	 housing	 to	 be	 high	 on	 the	 political	
agenda.	However,	 in	many	 cases	 the	housing	policy	 response	 to	 the	 crisis	 in	 Europe	 tended	 to	 reflect	
pre-crisis	policy	ideas	and	recipes,	rather	than	shifts	towards	an	increased	emphasis	on	social	housing.		
This	paper	 investigates	 the	neglect	of	 social	housing	 in	post-crisis	Hungary	and	 Ireland,	 two	peripheral	
European	countries	particularly	hard	hit	by	the	housing	crisis.	We	investigate	how	governments	in	both	
countries	 frame	 the	housing	question,	 and	how	 they	 strategically	 use	 the	 issue	of	 housing	 to	 build	 or	
sustain	 social	 coalitions	 around	 housing	 that	 systematically	 exclude	 the	 most	 precarious	 households.	
Following	Jabko’s	(2016)	strategic	constructivism,	we	argue	that	housing	policy	represents	a	marketplace	
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of	 ideas.	 Policies	 that	 address	 housing	 issues	 may	 be	 about	 housing	 as	 an	 asset,	 a	 social	 right,	 or	
patrimony.	The	pre-crisis	policies	have	seen	the	ascent	of	the	housing	as	an	asset	frame,	and	empowered	
coalitions	of	banks,	homeowners,	developers	and	the	construction	industry.	While	we	see	changes	in	the	
dominant	frame	–	or	policy	paradigm	-,	no	government	has	fully	returned	to	the	housing	as	a	social	right	
frame.	Rather,	a	thorough	review	of	the	social	housing	policy	reforms	and	new	housing	programs	reveals	
policies	 that	 continue	 to	 primarily	 cater	 to	 the	 existing	 housing	 coalitions.	 To	 put	 it	 differently:	while	
there	were	significant	housing	policy	responses	to	the	crisis	in	Hungary	and	Ireland,	these	did	not	target	
the	most	vulnerable	segments	of	the	population	and	focused	on	mortgage	relief	or	support	for	existing	
homeowners.	While	policies	actively	 supported	 the	previous	beneficiaries	of	housing	policy	before	 the	
crisis,	they	largely	excluded	the	most	vulnerable	households.		
The	paper	is	structured	as	follows.	In	the	next	section,	we	summarize	the	housing	needs	and	structures	
of	 housing	 systems	 in	Hungary	 and	 Ireland	 in	 the	wake	of	 the	 crisis.	 In	 section	 three,	we	 present	 our	
analytical	framework.	The	fourth	section	presents	case	studies	of	social	policy	after	the	crisis	in	Hungary	
and	Ireland,	also	including	relevant	policies	from	before	the	crisis.	We	show	the	consistency	of	housing	
as	an	asset	and	patrimony	 in	each	case	and	 link	this	to	the	pre-existing	beneficiaries	of	housing	policy.	
Finally,	we	conclude	and	offer	insights	for	future	research.	
2.	Housing	needs	and	housing	expenditure	
There	is	clear	evidence	of	acute	housing	needs	in	Hungary	and	Ireland	in	the	wake	of	the	crisis.	In	this	
section,	we	briefly	present	a	few	indictors	to	shed	light	on	the	dynamic	housing	need	in	Hungary	and	
Ireland.	Figure	1	shows	the	share	of	households	with	mortgage	or	rent	arrears.	A	very	sharp	increase	is	
visible	in	Ireland	between	2008	and	2011.	Hungary	also	experienced	steady	increases	in	the	share	of	
households	not	making	payments	in	time	from	2006	to	2014.	
	 3	
Figure	1:	Percentage	of	households	with	mortgage	or	rent	arrears,	2003-2016	
	
Source:	EU-SILC	
The	instances	of	arrears	among	low	income	households	was	greater,	as	shown	in	Figure	2.		
Figure	2:	Percentage	of	households	with	mortgage	or	rent	arrears	for	households	with	income	below	
60%	of	median	equivalized	income,	2003-2016	
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Source:	EU-SILC	
In	Hungary,	lower	income	households	were	significantly	affected	by	the	crisis.	While	the	policy	solutions	
in	Ireland	reduced	the	instances	of	arrears	for	all	income	categories,	in	Hungary,	lower	income	
households	still	have	high	rates	of	arrears.		
Figure	3	 summarizes	 the	government	 spending	on	housing	policy	as	a	 share	of	GDP.	The	 figure	 shows	
that	government	spending	on	housing	 increased	significantly	 in	 Ireland	during	the	crisis.	However,	 this	
increase	 did	 not	 break	 the	 secular	 trend	of	 declining	 spending.	 In	Hungary,	 the	 expenditure	 has	 been	
relatively	 steady,	 but	 there	 is	 a	 marked	 decrease	 in	 2009	 as	 a	 part	 of	 austerity	 packages	 and	 an	
increasing	trend	since	the	second	Orbán	government	took	office	in	2010.	This	demonstrates	that	housing	
policy	 has	 become	 more	 salient	 again,	 but	 very	 little	 attention	 is	 given	 to	 social	 housing	 as	 will	 be	
outlined	in	the	case	studies	later	in	the	paper.		
	
Figure	3:	Housing	expenditure	as	a	share	of	GDP	from	2000-2015	
	
Source:	Eurostat	
	
	
	
	 5	
	
While	both	Hungary	and	 Ireland	are	characterized	by	high	homeownership	and	 limited	rental	markets,	
social	and	private	rental	markets	have	expanded	in	Ireland.	Figure	4	shows	the	share	of	households	that	
are	 owners,	 renters	 at	 market	 price,	 or	 renters	 below	 market	 price,	 meaning	 living	 in	 social	 rental	
housing.		
Figure	4:	Share	of	low	income*	households	owing,	and	renting	at	or	below	market	price	in	Hungary	
(left)	and	Ireland	(right)	(*meaning	below	60%	of	median	equivalised	income)	
Source:	EU-	SILC	
The	figure	shows	that	in	both	countries	a	majority	of	low	income	households	were	homeowners	for	the	
entire	time	period.	There	is	almost	no	change	in	the	rental	markets	in	Hungary,	whereas	in	Ireland	there	
is	a	clear	 trend	of	 low	 income	households	shifting	 from	homeownership	 into	 rental	markets,	 including	
social	and	private	markets.	We	will	explore	this	shift	in	the	case	study	later	in	the	paper.		
3.	Strategic	constructions	of	frames	in	a	multifaceted	policy	area	
To	 understand	 when	 and	 whether	 social	 housing	 was	 a	 politically	 salient	 issue,	 we	 investigate	 the	
coalitions	 of	 actors	 around	 the	 existing	 housing	 paradigms	 (Hall	 1993).	 We	 argue	 that	 the	 dominant	
frame	for	housing	helps	governments	to	forge	coalitions	of	actors	that	“strategically	construct”	housing	
policy	(Jabko	2006).	Given	the	multiplicity	of	frames	for	housing	policy	presented	below,	we	argue	that	a	
diverse	 range	 of	 options	 exist	 for	 strategic	 coalitions	 that	 can	 influence	 the	 type	 of	 social	 housing	
programs	that	are	available.	Thus,	although	social	housing	seems	to	be	most	logically	connected	to	the	
housing	as	a	social	right	frame,	alternative	approaches	to	social	housing	exist	that	relate	to	housing	as	an	
asset	and	even	housing	as	patrimony	(Allen	et	al.	2004,	Norris	2016).	Like	Hegedűs,	Lux,	and	Teller	(2014)	
,	we	understand	social	housing	to	be	any	program	that	supports	“those	who	would	not	otherwise	be	able	
to	afford	an	acceptable	standard	of	housing”	(Hills	2000,	1).	
To	understand	 the	policy	 response	 to	housing	crises,	we	 first	define	 three	possible	 frames	 for	housing	
and	consider	the	relevant	actors	that	may	form	a	strategic	coalition	(see	Table	1).	The	first	is	housing	as	a	
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social	right,	which	assumes	that	access	to	decent	housing	for	all	members	of	society	is	an	obligation	of	
the	 state.	 This	 paradigm	 still	 recognizes	 the	 primary	 role	 of	markets	 for	 distributing	 housing,	 but	 it	 is	
based	 on	 egalitarian	 values	 and	 necessitates	 state	 intervention	 to	 secure	 housing	 for	 those	 who	 are	
unable	 to	 obtain	 it	 on	 the	 market.	 This	 paradigm	 essentially	 shaped	 Scandinavian	 post-war	 policies	
(Christophers	 2013).	 On	 the	 opposite	 extreme	 is	 housing	 as	 an	 asset,	 which	 emphasized	 individual	
property	 rights	and	 the	efficiency	of	markets	 for	distribution.	State	 intervention	would	be	generally	 to	
increase	 homeownership.	 Ownership	 of	 a	 home	 is	 expected	 to	 offset	 the	 risk	 of	 unemployment,	
sickness,	and	poverty	in	old	age	and	this	is	a	core	aspect	of	asset-based	welfare.	Policies	that	align	with	
the	housing	as	 an	asset	 framework	would	protect	private	property	and	privatize	homeownership.	The	
housing	as	a	social	right	policy	frame	aims	to	control	housing	markets,	whereas	the	housing	as	an	asset	
frame	aims	to	encourage	development	of	private	markets	and	incentives.	Housing	as	patrimony	is	where	
the	state	is	less	involved	in	housing	policy	and	families	are	the	only	form	of	dependable	support	to	those	
in	 vulnerable	 housing	 situations.	 Property	 is	 inherited	 from	 family	 or	 family	 support	 enables	 the	
acquisition	of	new	housing.	Like	housing	as	an	asset,	high	homeownership	is	likely	due	to	the	priority	to	
keep	property	in	the	family.	Families	are	valued	as	a	stabilizing	force	in	a	rapidly	changing	world	and	this	
frame	 subscribes	 to	 traditional	 conservative	 values.	 These	 are	 ideal	 types	 and	 clearly	 the	 real-existing	
housing	policy	of	a	country	may	adopt	different	logics	for	different	policy	approaches.	
	
Source:	(Bohle	and	Seabrooke	2017)	
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The	existence	of	multiples	frames	for	housing	means	that	policy-makers	have	flexibility	in	the	alternative	
framings	for	housing.	Housing	policy	impacts	a	distinctly	diverse	range	of	actors,	including	homeowners,	
renters,	homeless	people,	banks,	developers,	the	construction	industry,	 investors,	 landlords,	and	more.	
We	aim	to	detect	the	main	beneficiaries	of	housing	policy	approaches	to	understand	how	their	diverse	
motivations	match	different	frames	for	housing.	We	apply	Jabko’s	understanding	of	a	political	strategy	as	
“a	socially	constructed	method	of	collective	action	that	brings	together	actors	with	diverse	motivations”	
(Jabko	 2006,	 26).	 We	 detect	 coalitions	 between	 actors	 that	 promote	 specific	 approaches	 to	 housing	
policy	 and	 often	 these	 actors	 have	 different	 end	 goals,	 but	 agreement	 on	 an	 intermediate	 goal.	 For	
example,	increasing	access	to	homeownership	for	families	may	fit	with	the	long-term	goals	of	housing	as	
an	asset	or	housing	as	patrimony.	Jabko	argues	that	the	market	was	“invoked	to	legitimize	a	surprisingly	
wide	 range	of	policies”	 in	 the	 integration	of	 the	European	Union	 (Jabko	2006,	 30).	 Similarly,	we	 claim	
that	 promotion	 of	 social	 housing	 can	 imply	 a	 diverse	 range	 of	 policies,	 depending	 on	 the	 coalition	 of	
actors	behind	it	and	the	dominant	frame	for	housing.		
We	would	expect	 strengthening	of	 social	housing	policy	 that	 includes	primarily	public	housing	options	
only	when	the	groups	with	 the	most	precarious	housing	situation,	usually	 low	 income	households,	are	
included	 in	 the	 strategic	 coalitions	 that	 frame	housing	policy.	 In	our	empirical	 case	 studies,	 this	 rarely	
occurs.	 As	 we	 will	 demonstrate	 in	 the	 following	 section,	 the	 systematic	 exclusion	 of	 these	 most	
vulnerable	groups	and	the	lack	of	a	proxy	to	represent	them	implies	that	public	housing	options	remain	
absent.	Rather	the	strategic	coalitions	form	between	existing	homeowners,	banks,	developers,	and	the	
construction	industry	that	fundamentally	shape	social	housing	through	the	lens	of	housing	as	an	asset	or	
housing	as	patrimony.	While	the	social	right	paradigm	seems	to	be	most	closely	related	to	social	housing,	
the	 alternative	 framings	 dominate	 and	 as	 we	 will	 show	 persist	 even	 when	 the	 housing	 systems	 are	
rattled	by	crisis.	
4.	Case	studies:	Social	housing	policy	responses	in	Hungary	and	Ireland	
In	this	section,	we	summarize	the	social	housing	policy	responses	to	the	crisis	in	Hungary	and	Ireland.	To	
structure	our	case	studies	we	systematically	investigate	which	actors	shape	housing	policies,	what	is	the	
policy	approach,	and	which	frame	for	housing	that	reflects.	We	identify	the	strategic	coalitions	in	housing	
policy	more	broadly	and	how	this	shaped	the	presence	or	absence	of	social	housing	policy.	We	focus	on	
the	 development	 in	 social	 housing	 policy	 after	 the	 crisis,	 but	 also	 outline	 the	 existing	 programs	 to	
provide	contexts.	One	important	difference	between	the	two	cases	is	degree	of	centralization	of	housing	
policy.	 Responsibility	 for	 social	 housing	 in	 Hungary	 was	 decentralized	 in	 the	 early	 1990s	 leaving	 the	
funding	of	social	housing	largely	up	to	municipalities,	whereas	in	Ireland	there	is	a	Housing	ministry	that	
guides	housing	policy	and	works	together	with	local	governments.		
Hungary	
Hungarian	housing	is	characterized	by	very	high	homeownership	rates	and	limited	rental	market.	Social	
housing	units	in	Hungary	were	managed	by	local	governments	and	have	largely	been	privatized	since	the	
1980s.	 After	 the	 breakdown	 of	 communism,	 Hungarian	 housing	 policy	 gradually	 shifted	 towards	 the	
paradigm	 of	 housing	 as	 an	 asset	 (Bohle	 and	 Seabrooke	 2017).	 	 Since	 the	 crisis,	 the	 primary	 housing	
programs	have	been	mortgage	support	programs	(reflecting	housing	as	an	asset),	especially	those	that	
focused	 on	 housing	 for	 families	 (reflecting	 housing	 as	 patrimony).	 Although	 these	 programs	 were	
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politically	 framed	 as	 social	 housing	 programs,	 they	 mostly	 targeted	 more	 affluent	 households,	
homeowners,	and	the	construction	industry.		
The	asphyxiation	of	social	housing:	Local	government	public	rental	program	
Rental	housing,	even	in	private	hands,	is	so	limited	that	low	income	households	lack	secure	alternatives	
to	 buying	 their	 own	 home.	 The	 program	 that	most	 clearly	 resembles	 a	 social	 housing	 program	was	 a	
system	of	 rental	apartments	owned	by	 local	governments	and	 leased	 to	households	 in	need.	The	 rent	
was	 below	 market	 rates,	 but	 the	 precise	 level	 was	 decided	 by	 the	 municipality	 as	 there	 were	 no	
centralized	rent	controls.	The	local	governments	were	responsible	for	maintaining	the	housing	units	and	
generally	had	insufficient	funding	to	cover	the	costs	(Vigvári	2008).	This	produced	a	double	incentive	for	
local	 governments	 to	 sell	 the	 apartments	 off,	 as	 they	 did	 not	 have	 to	 pay	 maintenance	 costs	 and	
obtained	some	revenue	from	the	sale	(Dániel	1997).	Public	housing	rentals	represented	23%	of	dwellings	
in	1990,	but	due	to	privatization	this	was	down	to	4%	by	2001	(Hegedüs,	Lux,	and	Teller	2014,	15).	There	
was	a	policy	to	add	10,000	new	apartments	in	2000,	but	given	the	dominant	trend	of	privatization,	this	
did	not	make	a	significant	impact	(Csizmady	and	Hegedus	2016,	15).	The	apartments	were	sold,	usually	
to	 the	 occupants,	 at	well	 below	 half	 of	 their	market	 prices	 (Czirfusz	 and	 Pósfai	 2015).	 The	 remaining	
municipality-owned	apartments	are	mostly	in	cities.		
The	figure	below	shows	trends	in	privatization	of	the	municipal	housing	stock.	The	bars	indicate	the	
number	of	municipally	owned	apartments	that	were	sold.	The	dotted	line	shows	the	average	market	
value	of	the	municipality-owned	apartments	that	were	privatized	and	the	solid	line	shows	the	average	
price	obtained	when	the	apartments	were	privatized.	
Figure	5:		
	
Source:	(Czirfusz	and	Pósfai	2015,	486)	
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The	 large	 sale	 selling	 off	 of	 the	municipal	 housing	 stock	 supported	 the	dominance	of	 homeownership	
and	 left	 very	 limited	 options	 for	 the	 households	without	 secure	 funding.	 This	 process	 generated	 new	
homeowners,	but	limited	the	opportunity	for	future	social	housing	programs,	as	the	privatization	reform	
is	 one	 that	 is	 difficult	 and	 expensive	 to	 reverse.	 So	while	 this	 program	 still	 exists,	 its	 impact	 after	 the	
crisis	was	bound	to	be	extremely	limited	unless	a	major	reform	took	place.	No	such	reform	occurred	in	
the	area	of	public	housing.	The	housing	policy	that	did	exist	 in	the	aftermath	of	the	crisis	was	targeted	
towards	homeowners	with	foreign	denominated	loans	and	families,	as	summarized	below.	
Mortgage	support	systems	
The	 goals	 of	 the	 mortgage	 support	 systems	 were	 multifaceted,	 ranging	 from	 pronatalist	 policy	 to	
development	of	financial	markets	and	promotion	of	the	construction	industry.	The	program	introduced	
by	the	Fidesz	government	after	the	crisis	(CSOK)	reflected	the	logic	of	the	first	mortgage	support	system	
introduced	 in	 2000	 (szocpol),	 which	 is	 why	 we	 discuss	 these	 programs	 together	 in	 this	 section.	 The	
programs	 were	 clearly	 not	 designed	 to	 target	 the	 households	 with	 the	 most	 vulnerable	 housing	
situations,	 which	 corresponds	 to	 the	 middle	 class	 oriented	 welfare	 approach	 of	 the	 Hungarian	
conservative	 party	 that	 introduced	 most	 of	 these	 programs	 (Buskó	 2016).	 The	 beneficiaries	 of	 these	
programs	 included	 (mostly	middle	 and	 upper	 class)	 families,	 banks,	 and	 construction	 companies.	 The	
political	framing	of	these	programs	suggest	that	they	are	the	closest	match	to	a	social	housing	program	
in	 Hungary.	 In	 fact,	 precisely	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 beneficiaries	 of	 this	 mortgage	 support	 approach	 to	
housing	 policy	 explains	 why	 programs	 supporting	 more	 vulnerable	 and	 lower	 income	 groups	 are	
essentially	neglected.		
The	introduction	of	a	generous	housing	loan	subsidy	program,	starting	from	1999	under	the	first	Orbán	
government,	was	the	first	major	mortgage	support	system.	It	included	grants	for	young	families	to	build	
or	 buy	 homes.	 The	 program	 allocated	 substantial	 resources	 for	 interest	 rate	 subsidies	 on	 long-term	
mortgage	loans	at	first	only	for	new	houses,	but	later	for	existing	dwellings	as	well.	 In	addition,	people	
who	took	a	housing	loan	also	received	income	tax	exemption	(Hegedüs	2011,	Nagy	2015).	Combining	all	
the	mortgage	supports	and	tax	exemptions,	the	support	covered	50-70%	of	the	mortgage	(Csizmady	and	
Hegedus	2016,	15).	Beneficiaries	of	the	program	were	(upper)	middle	class	families,	but	one	of	the	policy	
adviser	 active	 in	 designing	 the	 program	 claimed	 that	 trickle	 down	 effects	 should	 benefit	 low	 income	
families	indirectly	as	they	can	move	into	the	homes	that	the	better	off	families	moved	out	of	thanks	to	
government	support.1	
Though	there	was	some	variation	in	the	precise	conditions	of	the	programs,	the	family-based	mortgage	
support	 systems	by	both	 the	 right	and	 left	 governments	emphasized	 support	 for	 (upper)	middle	 class,	
young	families	to	build	or	buy	new	homes.	The	program	introduced	by	the	left	government	from	2002-
09	 (“Nesting”	 program,	 “Fészekrakó	 program”)	 also	 included	 some	 rental	 support	 for	 low	 income	
families,	 but	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 program	was	 limited	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 rental	market	 in	 Hungary	 is	
mostly	 informal	 and	 landlords	would	 be	 required	 to	 pay	 tax	 on	 the	 income	 generated	 by	 renting	 the	
apartment	through	a	social	rental	program.	However,	this	program	was	suspended	as	a	part	of	a	broad	
																																								 																				
1	Original	quotation:	“In	society	some	chain	effects	can	emerge	that	are	triggered	by	a	well-off	family	moving	out	of	
their	home.	This	decision	implies	that	a	slightly	lower	status	family	can	move	into	their	‘place’	for	whom	the	
apartment	represents	an	improvement	in	living	conditions”	(László	Mádi	as	quoted	in	Buskó	2016,	111)	
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austerity	reform	in	2009.	The	new	Orbán	government	that	came	to	power	in	2010	essentially	replicated	
the	 housing	 policy	 of	 the	 first	 Orbán	 government	 (Hegedüs	 2017).	 Pronatalist	 logic	 was	 even	 more	
evident	 as	 the	 CSOK	 program	 introduced	 in	 2015	 targeted	 families	 with	 at	 least	 three	 children.	 In	
additional	 to	 mortgage	 support	 systems,	 the	 government	 waived	 VAT	 tax	 on	 building	 materials	 for	
families	that	qualified.	These	programs	encouraged	the	purchase	or	building	of	new	housing	units,	which	
were	clearly	aligned	with	the	interests	of	the	construction	sector.	After	much	political	debate	and	public	
backlash,	 some	 limited	 benefits	 were	 given	 to	 families	 with	 less	 than	 three	 children	 or	 for	 used	
apartments,	but	the	scale	of	the	benefits	was	substantially	lower.		
Support	for	households	with	foreign	currency	denominated	debt	
Since	the	crisis	the	most	pressing	housing	policy	has	been	programs	to	support	households	with	foreign	
denominated	 loans	 who	 suddenly	 faced	 escalated	 levels	 of	 debt.	 Foreign	 denominated	 mortgages	
represented	70%	of	the	mortgage	portfolio	(Housing	Europe	2015).	The	policies	included	a	moratorium	
on	 foreclosures,	 a	 National	 Asset	 Management	 Company	 to	 buy	 up	 properties	 that	 faced	 default,	
schemes	for	early	repayment	or	setting	a	maximum	loan	rate,	forcing	banks	to	accept	conversion	of	debt	
to	Hungarian	 forint,	 and	more	 (for	 a	 comprehensive	 summary,	 see	Csizmady	 and	Hegedus	 2016).	 The	
beneficiaries	of	these	programs	were	suddenly	very	vulnerable	based	on	the	exponential	growth	of	debt	
levels	due	to	exchange	rate	changes.	However,	these	were	not	necessarily	low	income	households.	One	
main	 strategy	was	 to	 enable	households	 to	pay	off	 the	debt	 in	 full	 on	 relatively	 favorable	 terms.	 This	
option	was	clearly	more	feasible	for	higher	income	households	and	about	20-25	percent	of	households	
holding	 foreign-denominated	 debt	 utilized	 this	 option	 (Hegedüs	 2017,	 95).	 The	 lowest	 income	
households	 that	 also	 held	 foreign-denominated	 debt	 generally	 had	 years	 of	 accumulated	 arrears	 and	
insufficient	resources	to	pay	off	the	loan,	even	with	a	favorable	exchange	rate.	The	Orbán	government’s	
main	 approach	 was	 that	 (foreign-owned)	 banks	 should	 bear	 the	 burden	 of	 responsibility	 and	 (upper)	
middle	class	household	should	be	relieved	of	the	debt	burden.	
The	 range	 of	 policy	 options	 also	 included	 programs	 for	 lower	 income	 households.	 The	National	 Asset	
Management	Company	(NAMC)	bought	delinquent	 loans	and	the	rented	the	apartments	to	the	former	
owner	 at	 below	market	 rates	with	 the	 option	 to	 buy	 back	 the	 home	 in	 five	 years.	 The	 program	 gave	
priority	to	families	with	children.	One	issue	was	that	30	percent	of	the	participating	households	could	not	
afford	 the	 reduced	 rate	of	 rent	 due	 to	being	 completely	 overwhelmed	with	debt	 (Hegedüs	 2017,	 96).	
Another	policy	response	that	most	closely	resembled	a	social	housing	response	was	the	construction	of	a	
public	 housing	 community	 in	Ocsa,	 south	 of	 Budapest.	 This	 housing	was	 intended	 to	 help	 households	
who	lost	their	homes	due	to	foreclosures.	However,	very	few	people	moved	into	these	housing	units,	as	
the	 transportation	 from	 this	 site	 to	 Budapest	 is	 difficult.	 The	 cost	 efficiency	 of	 the	 program	 was	
disastrous	(helping	about	40	households	burdened	by	foreign-denominated	debt)	and	the	space	rather	
became	an	emergency	shelter	for	people	whose	homes	were	destroyed	in	natural	disasters.	The	choice	
to	 build	 a	 new	public	 housing	 facility	 rather	 than	 rental	 support	 for	 households	 to	move	 into	 existing	
apartments	again	indicates	a	preference	to	support	the	construction	industry.	
Framing	the	policy	choice	
The	 decision	 to	 not	 support	 social	 housing	 or	 the	 rental	 market	 is	 explicitly	 justified	 by	 government	
officials.	The	framing	suggests	a	strategic	coalition	with	existing	homeowners	and	economic	actors.	The	
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economic	actors	are	not	named	specifically,	but	based	on	the	policy	design	it	 is	clear	that	the	program	
has	 the	 interests	of	 the	 construction	 industry	and	upper	middle	 class	 families	at	 its	 core.	When	asked	
about	 social	 rental	 housing	 during	 a	 parliamentary	 debate,	 the	 Minister	 for	 the	 National	 Economy,	
András	 Tállai	 said,	 “The	 government	 prefers	 house	 creation	 programs	 [over	 building	 social	 housing	
units],	and	that	is	why	we	created	CSOK,	because	for	some	reason	Hungarian	people	like	to	live	in	their	
own	 homes,	 rather	 than	 in	 other	 people’s”2.	 This	 confirms	 that	 any	 housing	 policy	 of	 the	 current	
government	 will	 aim	 to	 support	 homeowners	 who	 are	 indeed	 in	 the	 majority,	 but	 this	 leaves	 little	
options	 for	 vulnerable	 households	 without	 access	 to	 homeownership.	 When	 Prime	 minister	 Orbán	
described	 the	 motivation	 behind	 the	 CSOK	 program,	 he	 said,	 “Regarding	 housing	 development,	 this	
policy	 is	 simultaneously	 a	 family	 benefit	 and	 an	 economic	 growth	 stimulus”3	 (“Orbán	Viktor	Napirend	
Előtti	 Felszólalása”	 2016).	 These	 statements	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 exclusion	 of	 the	 most	 vulnerable	
population	 is	 an	 explicit	 political	 choice,	which	 helps	 explain	 the	 lack	 of	 social	 housing	 programs	 that	
benefit	low	income	households.	.	
Furthermore	 the	 policy	 choice	 to	 support	 new	 buildings	 indicates	 strong	 support	 for	 the	 construction	
sector,	 which	 is	 made	 up	 of	 primarily	 of	 Hungarian	 small	 and	 medium	 sized	 enterprises,	 which	 is	
consistent	with	the	Orbán	government’s	unorthodox	approach	deemed	“financial	nationalism”	(Johnson	
and	Barnes	2015).	The	mortgage	support	systems	from	the	2000s	and	after	the	crisis	also	benefit	banks	
by	increasing	the	number	of	mortgages,	but	explicit	preference	was	given	to	domestic	banks	over	foreign	
ones.	 The	 coalition	 with	 the	 construction	 industry	 and	 domestic	 banks	 was	 explicitly	 stated	 by	
government	 representatives	 (See	 for	 example:	 “Parliamentary	 Debate	 on	 Housing	 Creation	 Program”	
2016).	 The	 government	 could	 legitimize	 their	 approach	 housing	 and	 the	 absences	 of	 the	 model	 of	
housing	as	a	social	 right	was	unproblematic,	as	 their	approach	explicitly	combined	housing	as	an	asset	
and	 housing	 as	 patrimony.	 This	 clearly	 reflects	 the	 coalition	 between	 middle	 class	 homeowners,	 the	
construction	industry,	which	persisted	before	and	after	the	crisis.	
Ireland	
In	the	decades	before	the	crisis,	Ireland	also	exhibited	high	homeownership	rates	(though	not	as	high	as	
Hungary)	 and	 a	 family	 based	 model	 of	 residential	 capitalism,	 which	 treats	 housing	 as	 patrimony.	
Historically	access	to	mortgages	and	the	rental	market	were	both	highly	restricted,	which	implied	major	
dependence	on	families.	Since	the	early	19th	century,	many	programs	supported	households	becoming	
homeowners,	such	as	the	“right	to	buy”	social	housing	units	at	reduced	prices	(Norris	2016)	.	There	have	
been	some	important	shifts	in	Irish	social	housing	reducing	the	dominance	of	homeownership	and	slight	
increases	 in	 rental	market.	Over	 the	past	 twenty	years,	 there	have	been	decreases	 in	homeownership	
																																								 																				
2	Original	text:	“Ami	pedig	a	lakásépítési	programot	illeti,	a	kormány	gondolkodása	a	következő.	Tehát	először	is	a	
sajátotthon-teremtési	programokat	preferálja,	ezért	hozta	létre	a	CSOK-ot,	mert	a	magyar	ember	azt	szereti	
valamiért,	hogyha	nem	a	máséban	lakik,	hanem	a	sajátjában.	Erre	való	a	CSOK.	2016-ban	36	ezer	család	
jelentkezett,	87	milliárd	támogatást	igényeltek.”	
3	Original	text:	“Ami	az	otthonteremtést	illeti,	ez	egyszerre	családtámogatás	és	gazdasági	növekedést	ösztönző	
lépés.…	Az	otthonteremtésnél	a	magyar	kormány	álláspontja	az,	hogy	azt	kell	támogatni,	azt	kellene	támogatni,	
hogy	a	magyar	családok	saját	lakáshoz	juthassanak.	Szeretném,	ha	az	otthonteremtés	ügye	nemzeti	üggyé	válna	itt,	
a	parlamentben	is.	Bár	voltak	viták	itt,	a	parlamentben	és	a	közéletben	általában,	de	az	elmúlt	öt	évben	sikerült	jó	
néhány	kérdést	nemzeti	üggyé	tenni,	mint	a	gyermekes	családok	támogatása,	a	munkahelyteremtés	vagy	a	
rezsicsökkentés.	Örülnék,	ha	az	otthonteremtési	rendszer	támogatása	is	csatlakozna	ehhez	a	sorhoz.”	
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rates	 from	78	percent	 in	2005	 to	70	percent	 in	2015	 (European	Mortgage	Federation	2017,	33)	 and	a	
growth	 in	 both	 private	 and	 social	 rental	 markets.	 While	 these	 shifts	 are	 significant,	 we	 claim	 that	
preferential	treatment	of	homeowners	still	defines	Ireland’s	social	housing	policy.	
Assistance	leading	to	homeownership	
In	 the	 decades	 before	 the	 crisis,	 the	 primary	 concern	was	 affordability	 of	 housing	 due	 to	 rising	 home	
prices.	 The	 social	 housing	 policy	 primarily	 focused	 on	 enabling	 low	 income	 households	 to	 also	 have	
access	to	homeownership.	The	Irish	model	of	“socialized	homeownership	regime”	involved	a	wide	range	
of	 programs	 to	 supported	 transition	 to	 homeownership	 (for	 a	 comprehensive	 summary,	 see	 Norris	
2016).	This	included	making	mortgages	more	accessible	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	and	support	for	people	
in	 government	 sponsored	 housing	 programs	 to	 become	 homeowners	 in	 earlier	 waves	 of	 selling	 off	
government	housing	at	low	prices	in	the	1990s.	For	example,	the	Shared	Ownership	Program,	introduced	
in	 1991	 and	 expanded	 several	 times,	 enabled	 low	 income	 households	 to	 select	 a	 home	 for	 purchase,	
which	was	purchased	by	local	authorities	and	the	beneficiaries	lived	in	the	home	and	made	payments	to	
the	local	authorities	gradually	shifting	the	equity	to	the	beneficiary	over	the	course	of	25	years	until	they	
reached	 full	 homeownership	 (Norris	 and	 Winston	 2003,	 57).	 There	 was	 also	 a	 Mortgage	 Allowance	
Scheme,	which	 gave	 financial	 incentives	 for	 households	 in	 social	 housing	 units	 to	 buy	 housing	 on	 the	
private	 market.	 This	 implied	 that	 many	 of	 the	 beneficiaries	 of	 social	 housing	 programs	 became	
homeowners,	as	was	the	case	in	Hungary	through	the	privatization	of	social	housing.	This	meant	that	at	
the	onset	of	 the	housing	crisis	 in	both	countries,	 the	 interests	of	households	 facing	housing	 insecurity	
were	 fragmented	 as	 some	 already	 became	 homeowners,	 whereas	 others	 remained	 dependent	 on	
(social)	rental	markets	or	other	precarious	housing	arrangements.		
These	schemes	supported	a	large	number	of	household	representing	29	percent	of	total	buyers	between	
1991	and	2002,	the	period	before	the	property	bubble	(Norris,	Coates,	and	Kane	2007).	As	the	supports	
for	socialized	homeownership	became	more	targeted,	private	banks	stepped	in	and	expanded	lending,	
including	to	low	income	households.	There	was	a	general	lack	of	regulation	on	mortgage	lending,	which	
facilitated	easy	access	to	mortgages	and	the	housing	bubble.	One	enabling	factor	for	this	high	risk	model	
was	a	“cozy	relationship”	between	the	main	banks,	the	Fianna	Fáil	party,	and	property	developers	
(Dellepiane,	Hardiman,	and	Las	Heras	2013)	.	This	period	represented	a	shift	from	housing	as	patrimony	
to	housing	as	an	asset	model.		
Social	rental	market	
The	 programs	 supporting	 socialized	 homeownership	 were	 abolished	 in	 2011	 as	 a	 part	 of	 broader	
austerity	measures.	For	a	 few	years	housing	policy	 focused	on	managing	widespread	 foreclosures.	The	
levels	 and	 risks	 of	 homelessness	 increased	 sharply,	 which	 represented	 a	 return	 to	 dependence	 on	
families	 (Bohle	and	Seabrooke	2017,	19).	 There	was	also	a	notable	policy	 shift	 to	put	 an	emphasis	on	
social	 rental	housing	(see	Figure	4	above).	Support	 for	social	rental	housing	may	be	framed	as	a	major	
policy	shift	 in	 Irish	social	housing,	but	a	closer	examination	reveals	that	even	these	policies	are	market	
oriented	 and	 benefit	 homeowners	 and	 property	 developers.	 This	 is	 because	 rather	 than	 public	 social	
housing,	the	program	predominantly	provided	rental	support	for	housing	rented	on	the	private	market	
(Finnerty,	 O’Connell,	 and	 O’Sullivan	 2016;	 “Rebuilding	 Ireland:	 Action	 Plan	 for	 Housing	 and	
Homelessness”	 2016).	 This	 is	 clearly	 a	 market-oriented	 approach	 to	 social	 housing	 provision	 and	 the	
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design	of	the	policies	benefits	private	homeowners	(landlords)	and	developers.	The	expansion	of	social	
housing	stock	through	the	Social	Housing	Current	Expenditure	Programme	(SHCEP)	program	introduced	
in	2009	 increased	the	number	of	 long-term	leases	for	private	homes.	Additional	programs	also	offered	
incentives	 for	 investors	 to	 buy	 property	 for	 renting	 out,	 such	 as	 Interest	 Deductibility	 for	 Landlords	
where	landlords	can	deduct	interest	paid	on	loans	from	the	rental	income	before	paying	taxes.	
Table	2:	Overview	over	Irish	housing	support	schemes	
	
Source:	(O’Callaghan	2017,	2).	HAP:	Housing	Assistance	Payment,	RAS:	Rental	Accommodation	Scheme,	
SHCEP:	Social	Housing	Current	Expenditure	Program,	
Figure	6	below	shows	the	development	of	 social	housing	provision	 in	 Ireland.	 It	 shows	that	during	 the	
crisis,	 overall	 social	 housing	 provision	 has	 decreased,	 and	 local	 authorities	 have	 almost	 completely	
withdrawn	from	public	housing	provision.	It	is	only	in	2015	that	–	mostly	as	a	result	-	of	the	new	Housing	
Assistance	 Payment	 that	 social	 housing	 provision	 has	 increased	 again.	 The	 supply	 of	 social	 housing	 is	
almost	exclusively	provided	by	private	landlords,	financed	by	publically	administered	support	schemes.		
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Figure	6:	Social	housing	provision,	2004-2016	
	
Quoted	in	(O’Callaghan	2017,	2)	
	
The	housing	crisis	 indeed	recalibrated	 Ireland’s	approach	to	social	housing	and	made	the	expansion	of	
the	rental	market	an	explicit	policy	goal.	While	this	is	a	significant	shift,	the	policy	mechanisms	utilized	to	
expand	social	housing	clearly	 reflect	 the	 long-standing	coalition	between	banks,	existing	homeowners,	
and	developers.	Significant	incentives	were	offered	to	encourage	investment	in	property,	which	benefits	
landlords,	 banks	 (through	 increased	 lending),	 and	 the	 construction	 industry.	 There	 are	 clearly	 more	
meaningful	 benefits	 for	 low	 income,	 vulnerable	 households,	 especially	 when	 compared	 to	 Hungary.	
However,	the	post-crisis	promotion	of	social	housing	actually	fit	quite	well	within	the	housing	as	an	asset	
paradigm	given	its	focus	on	investors.	Therefore	the	strategic	construction	to	frame	housing	as	an	asset	
persisted	despite	rather	significant	programmatic	changes.	
	
5.	Conclusion	
In	 2017,	 almost	 a	 decade	 after	 Ireland’s	 housing	 boom	 turned	 bust,	 the	 Irish	 Minister	 for	 Housing	
describes	 the	country	 in	a	grip	of	a	housing	crisis.4	 In	Hungary,	meanwhile	 there	 is	a	deafening	silence	
about	the	fact	that	the	country	has	the	second	highest	rate	of	severe	housing	deprivation	in	the	EU	after	
Romania.5	 These	grave	 facts	notwithstanding,	 housing	policies	 are	 still	 largely	 shaped	by	 governments	
that	 rely	 on	 pre-crisis	 coalitions	 of	 homeowners,	 the	 construction	 industry,	 developers,	 and	 banks.	
Housing	policies	are	framed	in	terms	of	families,	or	asset	preservation.	There	 is	a	 surprising	stability	of	
social	 housing	 approached	 even	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 housing	 crisis.	 Even	 when	 we	 detect	 meaningful	
policy	shifts,	such	as	the	promotion	of	social	rental	markets	in	Ireland	after	2009,	the	dominance	of	the	
																																								 																				
4	http://www.thejournal.ie/factfind-social-housing-ireland-september-2017-3595887-Sep2017/	
5	Social	Europe	2016,	Report	on	Hungary,	prepared	for	ENLIGHTEN	work	package	3.		
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housing	as	an	asset	paradigm	is	evident	in	the	approach	to	social	housing,	which	focused	on	expansion	of	
private	sector	rentals.	One	major	difference	between	the	two	cases	is	that	most	rentals	in	Hungary	are	
not	officially	 recorded.	This	means	 that	policies	 to	encourage	 landlords	or	 to	expand	 the	 rental	 sector	
failed,	as	they	never	offered	a	more	appealing	arrangement	than	remaining	in	the	unofficial	economy.	In	
Ireland,	 property	 owners	 as	 landlords	 became	 a	 core	 constituency	 that	 organized	 and	 lobbied	 for	
preferential	conditions	(Reddan	2017).		
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Europe’s Demographic Challenge  
 
Eleni Tsingou (Copenhagen Business School) 
 
This chapter provides an overview of how demographic change is being discussed and addressed 
at the European Union level. It identifies some of the key actors operating in the Brussels arena 
and finds four key areas of policy activity: skill gaps and human capital; pension reform; work-
life balance and policies enabling choice on family formation; and active/healthy ageing.  The 
chapter explains that the bulk of this policy activity takes place in an institutional vacuum as 
authority on these issues is highly diffuse, policy timelines fragmented, and funding support 
scarce or politicized. As such demographic challenges are slow-burning in their temporal 
dimension, poorly communicated as talk between policymakers, experts, and the public, and have 
not led to specific tools. The chapter studies actor interactions and the spaces of policy 
discussions, including spaces as varied as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
and demography professional associations. It also explores the extent to which cooperation with 
non-governmental organisations and business actors provides opportunities for policy advocacy. 
It concludes that the most fruitful interventions at the European Union level happen around 
discussions about employment but that links to demographic change per se depend on policy 
entrepreneurship rather than institutional structures. 
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Governing Social Divergence in the Eurozone  
Laszlo Andor (Université libre de Bruxelles) 
 
The divergence that has developed within the euro area between core and periphery is the main 
threat to the existence of the single currency and to the stability of the EU as a whole. There is a 
dire need to develop governance tools that can strengthen the EMU architecture, and in particular 
to strengthen its real economic performance and its social dimension. Better governance is 
necessary, but it is not obvious that member states would hand over competences to a stronger 
EMU level governance structure without more risk sharing. This would also help strengthen 
public acceptance of the EMU. This chapter discusses how these issues must be addressed to 
avoid a slow-burning crises of greater social divergence and economic stagnation. While the ideal 
timing for paradigmatic shifts in policy thinking may have passed, policy frames must be 
developed at the European level that can deal with these issues, such as automatic stabilizers and 
unemployment insurance. A key question, however, is whether there is still sufficient political 
capital left among mainstream political forces to promote solutions that can counter the internal 
imbalances and divergence between the core and periphery within the Eurozone. These actors 
must engage in talk that focuses on strengthening discipline, solidarity and legitimacy 
simultaneously. A game changer for investment, growth and rebalancing is needed, and most 
likely it will be found in the area of fiscal capacity. 
	
